He also said he hoped power-sharing could be restored in Northern Ireland, but he knew at the time of the agreement that there would be problems to be solved in the future. 226.A number of witnesses expressed concern about the communication channels between Belfast and the British Government in London. Peter Sheridan said there was a risk of political and economic isolation for Northern Ireland. Despite David Davis`s good intentions, the reality was that “negotiations will take place to a large extent between the Council of the EU and the UNITED Kingdom, even as the Irish government has taken such a negotiation27. “will,” he said. 301 Professor Phinnemore was also concerned that “we are only a small part of the United Kingdom and that we are not particularly at the top of the london government`s priorities.” 302 11 Jennifer Todd was one of the few scholars to have identified Anglo-Irish relations as one of the most vulnerable aspects of the GFA, particularly in the event of Brexit.13 As she demonstrated two years before the Brexit referendum, Northern-South relations in Ireland had already been significantly compromised by the changing Anglo-Irish context. Following the 2008 financial crisis in the Republic of Ireland, successive governments in Dublin decided to focus on internal interests over interests and policies rather than North-South relations. Another example and precedent of a unilateral and destabilizing initiative was the referendum on citizenship in the Republic of Ireland in 2004, whose results were contrary to the citizens` rights that were defined in 1998.14 The Brexit referendum was therefore just another example of a major gap within the ACA: the incomplete and informal constitutional definition of the roles and duties of the two guarantor states.15 It is indeed quite paradoxical that the Irish states and the British could explicitly and repeatedly recognise the crucial importance of the European context in their reciprocal efforts to resolve their sovereignty dispute over Northern Ireland by the CMA, while London could, at the same time, forge increasingly conflicting relations with the EU, an increasingly contentious relationship that culminated in the 2016 exit referendum. In 2004, negotiations were held between the two governments, the DUP, and Sinn Féin, for an agreement to restore the institutions. The talks failed, but a document published by governments detailing the changes to the Belfast agreement was known as the “comprehensive agreement.” However, on 26 September 2005, it was announced that the Provisional Republican Army of Ireland had completely closed its arsenal of weapons and had “taken it out of service”.

Nevertheless, many trade unionists, especially the DUP, remained skeptical. Among the loyalist paramilitaries, only the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) had decommissioned all weapons. [21] Further negotiations took place in October 2006 and resulted in the St Andrews Agreement. These institutional provisions, established in these three areas of action, are defined in the agreement as “interdependent and interdependent”. In particular, it is found that the functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the North-South Council of Ministers is “so closely linked that the success of individual countries depends on that of the other” and that participation in the North-South Council of Ministers “is one of the essential tasks assigned to the relevant bodies in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland]. Paragraph 3 of the second part (Northern Ireland`s relations with the Republic of Ireland) states that the North-South Council of Ministers “will meet appropriately to examine institutional or cross-sector issues (including those relating to the EU) and resolve disputes.”